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Search, Seizure, and Washington's Section Seven:
Standing from Salvucci to Simpson
by Mark H. Adams* and George R. Nock**
In Jones v. United States,' the United States Supreme
Court gave birth in 1960 to the rule of "automatic standing,"
that is, the doctrine that one automatically has standing to con-
test an allegedly illegal search where his possession of the seized
evidence is an essential element of the offense with which he is
charged. The accused does not have to show that his own fourth
amendment' rights were violated, but only that the search and
seizure was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however,
gradually eroded the "automatic standing" rule during the 20
years following Jones, finally and completely overturning it in
United States v. Salvucci5 This article first traces the evolution
of that turnabout and discusses the approach that has replaced
the Jones rule in the Supreme Court. It then discusses the
Washington Supreme Court's continued adherence to the auto-
matic standing rule, despite the Salvucci decision, under the
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In Part I of this article, Commissioner Adams sets forth the history of the United
States Supreme Court's abandonment of its doctrine of "automatic standing" in cases
applying the fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and of the Washington
Supreme Court's retention of the doctrine under article I, section 7 of the Washington
constitution. Using Part I as background, Professor Nock in Part II then analyzes the
concept of standing in light of the declared purposes of the exclusionary rule and sug-
gests that courts consider discarding the rationale of deterrence of police misconduct and
replacing it with the concept that the exclusionary rule is a moral imperative for the
vindication of that right to privacy.
This article represents the respective personal viewpoints of its authors and should
not be construed as representing in any way the position of the Washington Court of
Appeals or any of its judges.
1. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
2. The fourth amendment states, "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.. . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
3. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
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Washington Constitution rather than the fourth amendment.
After focusing on the failure of the United States Supreme
Court to fashion a standing rule consistent with the Court's
stated purpose for the exclusionary rule, this article urges the
Washington court to interpret the state's constitution in a more
consistent, principled fashion. The Washington Supreme Court
has stated on separate occasions that the primary purposes
behind the Washington standing rule are to deter official mis-
conduct in searches and seizures and to preserve the underlying
privacy values of the Washington constitution. This article will
conclude that the Washington court should adopt the second of
these two purposes for the principled development of its stand-
ing rule in the best tradition of American federalism and
jurisprudence.
PART I
A. Background: Jones v. United States
In Jones, federal officers arrested Cecil Jones and charged
him with violating federal narcotics laws. The charges resulted
from the officers' discovery of illicit narcotics during execution
of a warrant to search an apartment in which Jones was present
but did not reside. Jones moved to suppress the evidence on the
grounds that the warrant was not issued upon probable cause.
The government challenged Jones' standing to move to suppress
because he neither admitted owning the seized articles nor
showed any interest in the apartment greater than that of "invi-
tee or guest."4
The Court acknowledged the longstanding principle that a
person cannot claim a constitutional protection unless he
"belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protec-
tion is given."' That principle, the Court noted, ordinarily
requires a person claiming fourth amendment protection to show
that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy, i.e., is
either the owner of the seized property or one who has a sub-
stantial possessory interest in the premises searched.'
The Jones Court, however, carved out an exception to the
personal privacy standing requirement in cases where possession
4. 362 U.S. at 259.
5. Id. at 261; Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907).
6. 362 U.S. at 261.
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of the seized evidence is an element of the offense charged. It
did so for two reasons: (1) A defendant charged with a posses-
sory offense might be able to establish his standing to move for
suppression only by giving self-incriminating evidence which
could be used against him subsequently at trial;7 and (2) the
prosecution should not be allowed the "advantage of contradic-
tory positions," i.e., asserting on the one hand that the accused
possessed the goods and is guilty, while arguing on the other
hand that he did not possess them for purposes of standing to
claim the protections of the fourth amendment. 8 Thus, in order
to prevent both the risk of self-incrimination and what became
known as the "vice of prosecutorial self-contradiction,"' the
Jones Court held that such a defendant had automatic standing
to rely upon the fourth amendment without having to show an
interest in the premises searched or the property seized. The
defendant had only to show that the search and seizure of the
evidence was unconstitutional. Jones went on to hold, alterna-
tively, "that the defendant need have no possessory interest in
the searched premises in order to have standing; it is sufficient
that he be legitimately on those premises when the search
occurs." 10
B. The Erosion of Jones
The Supreme Court eliminated the first of the Jones
Court's justifications for its "automatic standing" rule in Sim-
mons v. United States.1" In Simmons, the Court held that when
a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence
on fourth amendment grounds, his testimony may not later be
admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he fails
to object.' 2
In 1973, the Court considered the effect of Jones in the case
of Brown v. United States.'8 In Brown, the government accused
the defendants of transporting stolen goods and conspiracy to
transport stolen goods in interstate commerce. The goods were
7. Id. at 261-63.
8. Id. at 263-64.
9. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973).
10. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390 (1968) (summarizing the alterna-
tive holding of Jones).
11. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
12. Id. at 394.
13. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
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owned by a company for which Brown was a warehouse manager
and Smith, another defendant, was a truck driver. The govern-
ment accused Brown and Smith of pilfering the goods in Ohio
and delivering them to Clinton Knuckles, owner of a store in
Kentucky. Police officers seized the goods pursuant to a warrant
to search Knuckles' store. Knuckles was present at the store
during the search, but Brown and Smith were then in custody in
Ohio. All three defendants moved to suppress evidence obtained
by the search. The trial court granted Knuckles' motion on
grounds the search warrant was defective, but denied the motion
of Brown and Smith because they failed to assert a proprietary
or possessory interest in the searched premises or in the goods
seized.1'
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court noted that Sim-
mons had undermined the "self-incrimination dilemma, so cen-
tral to the Jones decision . . . ," but found it unnecessary to
reconsider the Jones holding because, unlike in Jones, the gov-
ernment's case against Brown and his co-defendants did not
"depend on [their] possession of the seized evidence at the time
of the contested search and seizure." 15 The defendants had
transported and sold the stolen goods to Knuckles some two
months before the search, and the indictments were limited to
the period before the search. Therefore, the Court saw no risk to
the defendants of either self-incrimination or prosecutorial self-
contradiction. The Court declared that the defendants had no
standing to challenge the search and seizure because they (a)
were not on the premises when the search and seizure occurred,
(b) alleged no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises,
and (c) were not charged with an offense, an element of which
was possession of the seized evidence at the time of the search
and seizure.16 Brown reiterated that "Fourth Amendment rights
are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights,
may not be vicariously asserted. '1 7
The Supreme Court accelerated its movement away from
the automatic standing rule in Rakas v. Illinois.5 In the process,
whereas Simmons eliminated the "self-incrimination dilemma"
14. Id. at 225-26.
15. Id. at 228.
16. Id. at 229.
17. Id. at 230 (citations omitted); accord Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
174 (1969).
18. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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behind the Jones rule, Rakas in effect eliminated the second
basis for that rule, the "vice" of prosecutorial contradiction.
Rakas involved an effort to suppress as evidence a sawed-off
rifle and rifle shells that were seized during a search of an auto-
mobile in which the defendants were passengers. The defendants
asserted no ownership interest in either the car or the weaponry
found in the glove compartment and under the front passenger
seat of the car. They argued that the Court should broaden the
Jones rule to confer automatic standing upon them as defend-
ants at whom a search was directed as "targets."1 Seizing on the
alternative holding of Jones, they also argued that they had
standing to contest the search because they were "legitimately
on the premises" (in the car) at the time of the search.' °
The Rakas majority refused to adopt either the so-called
"target theory"' 1 of standing or the idea that the phrase "legiti-
mately on the premises" should include passengers in an auto-
mobile. Instead, the Court emphasized that fourth amendment
rights are personal to and may be asserted only at the instance
of one who has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
searched."' The Rakas Court was concerned lest, by conferring
standing to raise vicarious fourth amendment claims, it would
unduly extend the exclusionary rule.'3 The Court concluded that
no useful analytical purpose was served in the context of sup-
pression of evidence by considering the question of standing
19. Id. at 133.
20. Id. at 132.
21. The Rakas majority opinion, id. at 132-38, discusses the defendants' "target"
theory at length. The theory, if not the appellation, appears to stem from the following
language in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960):
In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure" one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom
the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only
through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure
directed at someone else.
(Emphasis added.) See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 207-09 (1969) (Fortas,
J., concurring and dissenting).
22. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. In stressing the expectation-of-privacy factor, the Court
relied on the analysis developed in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967)
(electronic eavesdropping on calls placed from a telephone booth), and applied in United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (search of a double-locked footlocker into which
personal effects had been placed). See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)
("We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protec-
tion of privacy rather than property .... ") (majority opinion of Brennan, J.).
23. 439 U.S. at 137.
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apart from substantive fourth amendment law.24 The Court
stated the following:
[Tihe question is whether the challenged search and seizure
violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant
who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That
inquiry in turn requires a determination of whether the dis-
puted search and seizure has infringed an interest of the
defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to
protect.s5
Inasmuch as Rakas and the other defendant made no showing of
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or
the area under the seat of the car in which they were but pas-
sengers, the Court found that they lacked standing to contest
the search of someone else's car.' The phrase "legitimately on
the premises," coined to express the alternate basis for standing
in Jones, was explicitly rejected as creating "too broad a gauge
for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights." 7
Also ominous for the future viability of Jones, moreover,
was the Rakas Court's implicit rejection of the prosecutorial
self-contradiction factor. The prosecutor argued at the suppres-
sion hearing that the defendants lacked standing to challenge
the search because they did not own the rifle, the shells or the
automobile," yet at the trial was able to tie them to a robbery in
which the rifle was used" and the automobile was the getaway
vehicle. In declining to hold that the defendants had automatic
standing to challenge the search, the Court never alluded to the
prosecutorial self-contradiction factor.8 0
24. Id. at 138-40.
25. Id. at 140. This analysis was summarized in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
106 (1980): "After Rakas, the two inquiries [standing and legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy] merge into one: whether governmental officials violated any legitimate expectation
of privacy held by petitioner."
26. 439 U.S. at 149-50, n. 17.
27. Id. at 142 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 130.
29. The Supreme Court's opinion does not specifically refer to use of a rifle in the
robbery, but the Illinois Appellate Court's opinion below relates that a prosecution wit-
ness identified the rifle as that used by the robbers. People v. Rakas, 46 Ill. App. 3d 569,
572, 360 N.E.2d 1252, 1254-55 (1977).
30. Nor, for that matter, did the concurring opinion of Justice Powell or the dissent-
ing opinion of Justice White allude to the prosecutorial self-contradiction factor.
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C. Jones is Overruled
Simmons and Rakas set the stage for United States v.
Salvucci.1 In Salvucci, John Salvucci and John Zackular were
charged with possession of stolen mail."' The police seized
twelve checks during the search of an apartment rented by
Zackular's wife.38 The defendants moved to suppress. The gov-
ernment argued that they lacked standing. The district court
suppressed the evidence. The court of appeals affirmed the sup-
pression order. The court of appeals observed that despite Sim-
mons' elimination of the self-incrimination problem that under-
lay Jones, the "Supreme Court itself has questioned, but
unfortunately not decided, whether the second prong of the
Jones rationale, prosecutorial self-contradiction, alone justifies
the continued vitality of the doctrine of automatic standing.""'
Therefore, the court of appeals felt compelled to follow Jones
until the Supreme Court decided to overrule the automatic
standing doctrine.
The Supreme Court accepted the invitation. Writing for a 7-
to-2 majority, Justice Rehnquist" expressly reversed the auto-
matic standing rule of Jones v. United States. The majority
declared that the self-incrimination dilemma had been elimi-
nated by Simmons and that Rakas and other decisions "clearly
establish that a prosecutor may simultaneously maintain that a
defendant criminally possessed the seized good, but was not sub-
ject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal contra-
diction."36 Both prongs of the Jones automatic standing ration-
31. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
32. 448 U.S. at 85.
33. Although the Court's opinion states the apartment was rented by Zackular's
mother, 448 U.S. at 85, the First Circuit's opinion of which certiorari was granted, 599
F.2d 1094 (1979)-including the search affidavit quoted verbatim at 1095--consistently
describes the apartment as belonging to Zackular's wife. Zackular and his "wife" main-
tained separate apartments. Neither he nor Salvucci was prepared to show a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the wife's apartment or a proprietary or possessory interest in
the illicit checks. 599 F.2d at 1097.
34. 599 F.2d at 1097 (citations to Rakas and Brown omitted).
35. Justice Rehnquist also wrote the majority opinions for the Court in Rakas and
in the companion case to Salvucci, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). Justices
Marshall and Brennan dissented in all three cases. Justices White and Stevens, who also
dissented in Rakas, concurred with the majority's analysis in Salvucci and Rawlings.
36. 448 U.S. at 90. Justice Marshall, writing in dissent in Salvucci, conceded the
elimination of the prosecutorial self-contradiction concern when he wrote: "By holding
today in Rawlings... that a person may assert a Fourth Amendment claim only if he
has a privacy interest in the area that was searched, the Court has, to be sure, done away
with that logical inconsistency." 448 U.S. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ale were eviscerated. Thus, the Court abandoned the automatic
standing rule of Jones and stated its intention to limit the avail-
ability of the exclusionary rule to defendants who have been
subjected to a violation of their fourth amendment rights.3 7
D. The New Test: Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
What has the demise of "automatic standing" in Salvucci
done to the concept of standing to move to suppress evidence
seized from someplace other than the person of the accused? It
should be clear that a majority of the present Supreme Court, as
exemplified by the decisions in Salvucci, its companion case of
Rawlings v. Kentucky," and Rakas, will grant a defendant
standing to suppress seized evidence only if the accused had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. The
accused bears the burden of proving his legitimate expectation
of privacy, 9 and the issue will be decided on a case-by-case
basis.
Legal possession or ownership of a seized good will not
invariably confer the ability to assert the protection of the
fourth amendment; the Court has emphatically rejected the
notion that "arcane distinctions developed in property and tort
law" ought to control the fourth amendment inquiry.4 0 Nor will
the fact that one is "legitimately on the premises" any longer
confer standing to suppress.41 Even the fact of actual, physical
possession of the seized good will not be determinative.' A dis-
cussion of the respective positions of the majority and the two
dissenters in Salvucci and Rawlings will illustrate the Court's
current position as to the standing rule.
The dissenters in both Salvucci and Rawlings, Justices
Marshall and Brennan, argued two major points. The first is
that the "self-incrimination dilemma" relied on in Jones may
not have been put to rest after all, because the Simmons rule
against the prosecution's use of suppression hearing testimony
for purposes of making its case at trial has not been extended to
preclude use of such testimony to impeach the defendant if he
37. Id. at 95; accord Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-74 (1969).
38. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
39. See 448 U.S. at 104.
40. Id. at 105; accord Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
41. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 92; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142, 147-48.
42. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 92.
[Vol. 6:1
Standing and Section 7
takes the stand.48 The Salvucci majority declined to decide
whether this "use immunity" extends beyond the prosecution's
case-in-chief to preclude impeachment of the defendant. The
majority characterized the issue as more aptly relating "to the
proper breadth of the Simmons privilege," which it need not
then resolve, and declared peremptorily that the issue simply
did not relate to the need for retaining automatic standing."
The majority hinted in a footnote, however, that it saw no
impediment to use of suppression hearing testimony for pur-
poses of impeaching a defendant who elected to take the stand.'5
Moreover, the Court has approved impeachment of a defendant
by means of a prior inconsistent statement to police that was
inadmissible, under Miranda v. Arizona," in the prosecution's
case-in-chief." The Court has also approved impeachment of a
defendant by means of evidence illegally seized.48 Thus, the
Salvucci dissenters' concern appears well founded; the "self-
incrimination dilemma" will no longer be viewed by the majority
as grounds to preclude the use of suppression hearing testimony
for impeachment purposes.
Justice Marshall expressed the dissenters' second misgiving
about abandonment of the "automatic standing" rule in Rawl-
ings v. Kentucky.' In Rawlings, the police arrived at a house to
serve an arrest warrant on the homeowner. He was not home,
but five others were, including visitors Rawlings and Vanessa
43. Id. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 94.
45. Id. at 94 n. 9: "This Court has held that 'the protective shield of Simmons is not
to be converted into a license for false representations....' United States v. Kahan, 415
U.S. 239, 243 (1974)."
46. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
47. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Remarkably, Professors White and
Greenspan in their article, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
333, 342 (1970), described Miranda as stating that
impeaching statements are incriminating and are, therefore, admissible only if
the defendant makes them after effective waiver of his privilege against self-
incrimination. Simmons holds that a defendant testifying at a hearing on a
fourth amendment claim does not waive his privilege. It seems, therefore, that
the defendant is protected against any use of [suppression hearing] testimony
at his trial.
(Emphasis added.) (Footnotes omitted.) The rationale of Miranda was sharply curtailed
in Harris v. New York in a way that was not foreseen by these commentators.
48. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). In Havens, a defendant testified
he had nothing to do with a cocaine smuggling incident. The Supreme Court approved
the impeachment of his credibility by means of physical evidence that was obtained by
an illegal search and seizure.
49. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
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Cox. While searching the house for the owner, several officers
detected marijuana smoke and seeds. Two officers left to get a
search warrant while others stayed behind with the occupants.
The police returned 45 minutes later with a warrant and ordered
Cox to empty the contents of her purse. The purse contained
large quantities of illegal drugs that Rawlings had placed in it
just before the police arrived. As Cox poured the drugs out onto
a coffee table, she turned to Rawlings and told him to "take
what was his." Rawlings immediately claimed ownership of the
drugs.' 9 The Supreme Court held that Rawlings lacked stand-
ing to challenge the search because he had no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in Cox's purse. ' The Rawlings dissenters pro-
ceeded on the understanding that the defendants in Rakas had
not claimed fourth amendment protection based on automatic
standing or on their actual possessory interest in the items
seized, but had argued they had standing simply because they
were "legitimately on the premises. ' 5" The dissenters contended
that since Rakas did not address the Jones automatic standing
rule and did not preclude standing based on one's possessory
interest in the items seized, but was confined to overruling the
"legitimately on the premises" alternative holding of Jones, the
Rakas decision simply did not support the rationale of the Rawl-
ings majority. 51
The Rawlings dissenters appear to have read Rakas far too
narrowly. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Rawlings majority,",
noted that Rakas had "abandoned a separate inquiry into a
defendant's 'standing' to contest an allegedly illegal search in
favor of an inquiry that focused directly on the substance of the
defendant's claim that he or she possessed a 'legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy' in the area searched. See Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967)."53 Furthermore, the majority held that the
defendant after Rakas "bears the burden of proving not only
that the search of [Vanessa] Cox's purse was illegal, but also
that he [Rawlings] had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
49.1 Id. at 100-01.
49.2 Id. at 104-06.
50. Id. at 114-15.
51. Id. at 115.
52. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinions in Rakas, Rawlings, and Salvucci.
See supra note 35.
53. 448 U.S. at 104.
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that purse."54 The Rawlings majority, relying on Rakas, explic-
itly rejected the notion that a defendant's claim of ownership of
the items seized is determinative. Rather, the defendant's legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the area searched is the key
regardless of who owns or possesses the property."
A close reading of Rakas supports Justice Rehnquist's inter-
pretation of it. The fact is that Rakas completely abandoned the
idea that a determination of "standing" could be made apart
from an inquiry into whether the search and seizure at issue
infringed a fourth amendment interest of the accused.50 Thus,
not only did Rakas overrule the "legitimately on the premises"
aspect of Jones, but it entirely refocused the inquiry to be pur-
sued whenever a defendant seeks to suppress evidence seized as
a result of an allegedly illegal search." The interest at stake and
which the defendant must show, as announced by Rakas58 and
reaffirmed by Salvucci," is whether the "person who claims the
protection of the [Fourth] Amendment has a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the invaded place." To the extent the dissent-
ers in Salvucci/Rawlings persist in inquiring into a defendant's
"standing" based on his ownership of or possessory interest in
the items seized,a0 they are trying to close the barn door after
the horse is loose. Those concepts, it is clear, are no longer
determinative.
In Salvucci, the Supreme Court completed its inexorable
march towards overruling the "automatic standing" rule. In
54. Id.
55. Id. at 105-06.
56. 439 U.S. at 140. See supra note 25, and accompanying text.
57. The refocusing of the inquiry was presaged in Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364
(1968), in which Justice Harlan-writing for a 6-to-3 majority that included, incidentally,
Justices Brennan and Marshall-stated:
In Jones . . . we held that 'anyone legitimately on premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality . . . when its fruits are proposed to be used
against him.' The Court's recent decision in Katz v. United States also makes
it clear that capacity to claim the protection of the Amendment depends not
upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one
in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion.
Id. at 368 (citations omitted).
58. 439 U.S. at 143 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
59. 448 U.S. at 91-93.
60. 448 U.S. at 116-18. Some commentators have joined in the dissenters' criticism
of the majority for its abandonment of property ownership or possessory interest "as the
core of the protection of privacy" by the fourth amendment. See, e.g., The Supreme
Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REv. 196, 203 (1980).
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Rawlings the Court also made clear its departure from tradi-
tional considerations of standing when deciding whether a
defendant will be heard to complain about the admissibility of
illicit goods he is accused of possessing. Courts now must
examine a defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy on a
case-by-case basis under the fourth amendment. And yet the
cases have come full circle, in a way, since Jones. The Court's
new doctrine, born of a desire to limit the exclusionary rule,"
focuses the fourth amendment right back where Jones placed it:
"Ordinarily, then, it is entirely proper to require of one who
seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for sup-
pressing relevant evidence that he allege, and if the allegation be
disputed that he establish, that he himself was the victim of an
invasion of privacy."'
E. The Washington Approach: "Automatic Standing" is
Retained Under the State Constitution
The Washington Supreme Court promptly adopted the
Jones automatic standing rule. In State v. Michaels,63 the state
argued that the defendant, who was driving a car that police
searched illegally, lacked standing to challenge the search
because he did not own the car. The Michaels court declared
that the Washington Constitution and the Constitution of the
United States do not protect only those who have legal title to
the premises searched." The court explicitly relied on the "legit-
imately-on-premises" rule of Jones and endorsed the rationale
of the automatic standing doctrine, in holding that Michaels did
have standing.65
Michaels remained the rule in Washington until State v.
Simpson," a 1980 case decided only six months after Salvucci
and Rawlings. Simpson involved the police arrest of a man
wanted on a felony warrant. The officers waited for the suspect
at his home and placed him under arrest after he arrived in a
pickup truck.6 7 One officer thought the truck (which had big
tires, mag wheels, and two beer decals in the back window) "did
61. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137.
62. Jones, 362 U.S. at 261.
63. 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962).
64. Id. at 646, 374 P.2d at 993.
65. Id. at 646-47, 374 P.2d at 993.
66. 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980).
67. Id. at 172, 622 P.2d at 1202.
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not match" the arrestee and radioed for a registration check."
The policemen then took the arrestee to jail, where they learned
that the license plate was not assigned to that truck and con-
cluded that either the plate or the truck was stolen. The officers
returned to impound the truck and noticed it had no front
license plate. They used the arrestee's key to unlock the truck to
ascertain the vehicle identification number. They used that
number to run another check and confirmed that the truck was
stolen. They then read the arrestee his Miranda rights, ques-
tioned him, and obtained his admission that he had bought the
truck knowing it was stolen." Before trial the defendant moved
to suppress both the evidence derived from the vehicle identifi-
cation number and his incriminating statements to the police.
The prosecution challenged his standing to move for suppression
of the evidence.
The Simpson majority70 conceded that Salvucci had
recently overruled Jones and abolished the fourth amendment
standing rule. The majority, however, fixed upon the terse lan-
guage of the Washington Constitution search and seizure provi-
sion, which provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his pri-
vate affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."7'
Declaring that the court could interpret the state constitution as
conferring a higher degree of protection than is provided by the
federal constitution,7 the Simpson court held that the Michaels
automatic standing rule would be continued under the banner of
the Washington Constitution. 8 The court based its retention of
the automatic standing doctrine partially upon the state consti-
tution's "privacy clause, 747 but principally upon the self-incrimi-
68. The officer thought the arrestee was older than one likely to own such a truck.
Id. at 173, 622 P.2d at 1202.
69. Id.
70. Justice Williams wrote the lead opinion in which three others concurred. The
term "majority" is used to describe this opinion, despite the fact that it represents the
views of only four Justices. Justice Utter concurred separately. Justice Horowitz wrote a
dissenting opinion on behalf of two other dissenters. Justice Stafford did not participate
in the decision.
71. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
72. 95 Wash. 2d at 178, 622 P.2d at 1205.
73. Id. at 181, 622 P.2d at 1206.
74. Id. at 179-81, 622 P.2d at 1205-06. The court appears not to have relied on the
second Jones factor, that of prosecutorial self-contradiction. Id. at 179, 622 P.2d at 1205.
As regards that factor see White & Greenspan, supra note 47, at 343 where the authors
state:
[N]o Supreme Court case has ever suggested that the state government may
not attempt to gain a conviction by asserting inconsistent positions at two sep-
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nation dilemma which it found was still present due to possible
impeachment use of suppression hearing testimony. The court
reasoned that, since possession was an essential element of the
offense and the defendant had possession at the time of the con-
tested search, he was entitled to the full protection of the auto-
matic standing doctrine.7 5 As a matter of the doctrine's federal
application the exclusionary rule would be available if a person
(1) was charged with an offense, one element of which was pos-
session of an item at the time of the search, and (2) was able to
show that the search and seizure was unconstitutional. 6
Then, having found that defendant Simpson had automatic
standing to move to suppress the evidence proffered against
him, the majority nevertheless proceeded to address the State's
argument that Simpson had no legitimate expectation of privacy
in the vehicle identification number. The argument was prem-
ised upon the idea that a defendant "who has acquired auto-
matic standing in effect stands in the shoes of an individual
properly in possession of the property," so the court felt obliged
to inquire whether a rightful possessor of the truck could have
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the identification
number, making a search warrant necessary." The majority
found that Simpson had such an expectation of privacy in the
stolen truck's identification number, and that the warrantless
search was unlawful. 8
The dissenters in Simpson, in an opinion written by Justice
Horowitz, argued that the Washington courts had always inter-
preted the state's constitutional search and seizure provision
identically to the federal fourth amendment;7 9 that the Michaels
court's adoption of automatic standing was based solely on the
federal constitutional analysis of Jones;80 and that, as Salvucci
makes clear, the possible impeachment use of suppression hear-
ing testimony
arate stages in the criminal process. Thus, [this] rationale would probably sup-
port the retention of the "standing to avoid the dilemma" principle only in
federal cases.
(Footnote omitted).
75. 95 Wash. 2d at 181-82, 622 P.2d at 1207.
76. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 87; United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 52-56 (2d Cir.
1977); United States v. Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1976).
77. 95 Wash. 2d at 182, 622 P.2d at 1207.
78. Id. at 188, 192, 622 P.2d at 1210, 1212.
79. Id. at 195-96, 622 P.2d at 1214-15.
80. Id. at 196, 622 P.2d at 1215.
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has no place in the decision to extend or abandon the auto-
matic standing rule .... The automatic standing doctrine was
never intended as a "license to lie" for the defendant; it was
not developed to allow the defendant to perjure himself with-
out sanction or consequence.... The challenge to the veracity
of the defendant as a witness is a procedural matter which is
irrelevant to the establishment of his substantive Fourth
Amendment rights under the automatic standing doctrine.81
The dissenters went on to accuse the majority of being result
oriented rather than "principled" in its interpretation of the
state constitution in a manner inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the federal constitution.a"
Although the automatic standing rule of Jones seems dead
in the federal courts after Salvucci, the Washington Supreme
Court has retained the rule. While choosing to depart from
Salvucci and to retain the automatic standing rule in Washing-
ton, the Washington Supreme Court implicitly found that a
thief can have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item he
has stolen s and that the possibility of impeaching him with his
words spoken at a suppression hearing provides-Salvucci not-
withstanding-a "continuing policy basis" for adherence to the
81. Id. at 198-99, 622 P.2d at 1216.
82. Id. at 199-202, 622 P.2d at 1216-18. See Note, The New Federalism: Toward a
Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297 (1977).
83. Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 141 n.9 (1978):
The Court in Jones was quite careful to note that "wrongful" presence at the
scene of a search would not enable a defendant to object to the legality of the
search. 362 U.S. at 267. The Court stated: "No just interest of the Government
in the effective and rigorous enforcement of the criminal law will be hampered
by recognizing that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may
challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are pro-
posed to be used against him. This would of course not avail those who, by
virtue of their wrongful presence, cannot invoke the privacy of the premises
searched." Ibid. (Emphasis added). Despite this clear statement in Jones, sev-
eral lower courts inexplicably have held that a person present in a stolen auto-
mobile at the time of a search may object to the lawfulness of the search of the
automobile. See, e.g., Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (CA9 1967); Simp-
son v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (CA10 1965).
(Emphasis in original.) See also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12:
A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season may have a
thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy, but it is not one which
the law recognizes as "legitimate." His presence, in the words of Jones, 362
U.S., at 267, is "wrongful"; his expectation is not "one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring).
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automatic standing rule."'
The lesson for defense counsel in Washington courts is
clear: When seeking to establish standing in a suppression hear-
ing for a client charged with possessing the article sought to be
suppressed, the defense should rely upon Washington Constitu-
tion article I, section 7. The fourth amendment will not be suffi-
cient unless the accused can show a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the place searched.8 5
PART II
A. The Concept of Standing in Light of the Purposes of the
Exclusionary Rule
Against the foregoing background, it is possible to examine
the various opinions of the United States Supreme Court in
search of a coherent rationale for rules of "standing" to invoke
the exclusionary rule.86 On the assumption that a rule of judge-
made law ought to be interpreted in order to advance its pur-
poses, we turn to the various purposes articulated in justification
of the exclusionary rule. And it is clear that the preeminent pur-
pose is the deterrence of official misconduct.8 7 The application of
the rule is designed to remove any incentive for law enforcement
officials to commit unlawful searches or seizures by insuring that
the product thereof cannot be admitted in evidence by the pros-
ecution in criminal cases. It serves to "punish" erring police
officers as well, by frustrating their presumed vital interest in
obtaining convictions, through making such convictions difficult
or impossible where the officers have misconducted themselves.
The "negative side effect" of the exclusionary rule, an effect
84. 95 Wash. 2d at 179-81, 622 P.2d at 1206.
85. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d at 178, 622 P.2d at 1205, cites Alaska (State v. Glass, 583
P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978)), and Montana (State v. Brackman, 178 Mont. 105, 582 P.2d 1216
(1978)), as other states which have held that their own constitutions provide a higher
degree of protection in search and seizure cases than does the fourth amendment.
86. "Standing," incidentally, is a useful term, despite the United States Supreme
Court's asseverations of its obsolescence, and will be used in the following analysis.
87. This is the only purpose cited in either Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134 n.3, or Simpson,
95 Wash. 2d at 180, 622 P.2d at 1206, for the exclusionary rule. The deterrent purpose of
the rule is also the linchpin of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Court even shaped substantive fourth amendment law
on the premise of the rule's deterrent purpose and the need to articulate principles of
police conduct that could reasonably be expected to influence police behavior. A second-
ary purpose advanced for the exclusionary rule will be discussed infra notes 101-03 and
accompanying text.
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always emphasized in opinions limiting the rule's scope, is the
fact that it excludes relevant and probative evidence and thus
hampers the search for truth."8 This means that guilty people
sometimes go free. As will be seen, judicial concern over the neg-
ative social consequences of the exclusionary rule is the appar-
ent explanation for development of the rule along lines some-
times inconsistent with its purposes.
But it is at once clear that any sort of standing requirement
is at odds with the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. It
was early recognized by the great Justice Roger J. Traynor of
the California Supreme Court that full deterrent efficacy of the
rule requires that the prosecution be prevented from using ille-
gally obtained evidence, regardless of the person against whom it
is offered. 9 Accordingly, that court adopted the rule that any
person against whom such evidence is offered can complain of
the manner in which it was obtained, regardless of whether his
own fourth amendment rights were violated.90
The United States Supreme Court, however, has neither
accepted nor seriously attempted to refute the logic of this posi-
88. See, e.g., Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137.
The disadvantage of the exclusionary rule-freeing the guilty-is obvious. The best
argument for its deterrent rationale is that other methods of enforcing fourth amend-
ment rights are predictably or demonstrably ineffective. A central premise of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was that methods less destructive of the truth determining
process had clearly proved inefficacious. The exclusionary rule is effective because, and
to the extent, that it causes sanctions to be invoked at the instance of a party to litiga-
tion, with much at stake. By contrast, juries and even administrative agencies are
unlikely to become sufficiently upset at police conduct which has resulted in uncovering
serious crime to impose meaningful sanctions in the nature of civil damages or officer
reprimands. The Chief Justice of the United States has proposed creation of an impar-
tial quasi-judicial tribunal to administer damage suits based on fourth amendment viola-
tions. The effectiveness of such a remedy is obviously a matter of hopeful speculation.
And the Chief Justice would not abandon the exclusionary rule absent implementation
of an equally effective remedy. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
412-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
89. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955).
90. Id. This theory was found persuasive by the reporters of the Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure and initially adopted by the American Law Institute. Ulti-
mately, the Institute adopted an extremely loose standing requirement. See MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 290.1(5) commentary at 217-18 (1975).
Ironically, the California rule may have been jettisoned by the voters of that state.
Proposition 8, adopted by the California electorate in June, 1982, purports to work mas-
sive changes in California criminal procedure, including the abolition of search and
seizure rules not mandated by the federal constitution. The validity of this measure
under state law is in question and will eventually be adjudicated by the California
Supreme Court. See Uelman, Proposition 8 Casts Uncertainty Over Vast Areas of Crim-
inal Law, CALIF. LAw. July-Aug., 1982, at 43.
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tion. Its reasoning is illustrated by the following quotation:
The necessity for a showing of a violation of personal
rights is not obviated by recognizing the deterrent purpose of
the exclusionary rule, Alderman v. United States, [394 U.S.] at
174. Despite the deterrent aim of the exclusionary rule, we
never have held that unlawfully seized evidence is inadmissible
in all proceedings or against all persons.91
Rather, logic appears to be tempered by a purely pragmatic
desire to limit the scope of the exclusionary rule in order to
avoid paying the considerable social costs which it exacts. The
Court appears to be gambling on the notion that it can preserve
the deterrent efficacy of the rule while paying the price of its
application in ever-fewer situations. The Court has stated:
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those
whose rights the police have violated have been considered suf-
ficient to justify the suppression of probative evidence even
though the case against the defendant is weakened or
destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not con-
vinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusion-
ary rule to other defendants would justify further encroach-
ment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of
crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of
all the evidence which exposes the truth.'2
Similar reasoning was applied in Stone v. Powell," in which the
Court refused, in general, to recognize search-and-seizure claims
on collateral attack, on the theory that sufficient deterrence was
provided by allowing their assertion at trial and on direct
appeal.
Whatever the merit of Stone v. Powell, which did not
involve "standing," the concepts of standing and deterrence are
demonstrably incompatible. Deterrence is based on the vindica-
tion of a public interest; to allow its vindication only by a per-
sonally aggrieved private individual is to ensure that its vindica-
tion will be haphazard at best, and to guarantee the long term
impairment of that public interest.
In Rakas, nonetheless, after beginning with the well-worn
notion that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence,
the Court advanced to the highly questionable assumption that
91. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134 n.3.
92. Id. at 137 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969)).
93. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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effective deterrence would survive the Rakas rule itself which, as
the dissenters pointedly noted, would give the unscrupulous
police officer every incentive to "engage in patently unreasona-
ble searches every time an automobile contains more than one
occupant."'94
To this point, of course, the entire area of deterrence was
speculative. The Court speculated that it could retain deterrence
while making encroachments on the sanctions available for
fourth amendment violations. Skeptics speculated that police
would be quick to identify and seize upon the loopholes created
by the Court's restrictions on available remedies.95 Such specula-
tion was to be expected. The efficacy of deterrence under any
circumstances is more a matter of faith than hard data, a faith
resting on rational assumptions, such as that people can be
counted upon to identify and act upon their own enlightened
self-interest. The criminal law is built in part upon a foundation
of faith in deterrence-a faith often as touching as that of prelit-
erate peoples who observe a third year of drought by increas-
ingly frenzied rainmaking ceremonies. Curiously, the exclusion-
ary rule itself is the product of speculation concerning
deterrence: judicial speculation that the occasional inability of
the law to convict the guilty, resulting from suppression of evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Constitution, would not
impair the general deterrent efficacy of the criminal law. This
kind of speculation is as old as civilization, being manifested in
the ancient practice of decimation, under which every tenth
member of a deserting military unit was executed, as an example
to other cohorts. The king speculated that random punishment
would have the necessary in terrorem effect; he had no choice,
the alternative of executing all of the guilty being infeasible.
The Court's speculative, not to say gambling, approach to
deterrence of official misconduct became somewhat informed by
the facts of United States v. Payner." Payner was convicted of
filing a false income tax return. The return denied that he main-
tained a foreign bank account. The Internal Revenue Service
knew that he did have a foreign bank account, having gleaned
that information from an examination of the papers of one Wol-
stencroft, a Bahamian banker. The IRS had photographed Wol-
94. 439 U.S. at 168.
95. See Id. at 168-69 (White, J., dissenting).
96. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
1982]
20 University of Puget Sound Law Review
stencroft's papers after having removed them (with the aid of a
trustworthy locksmith) from the banker's locked briefcase. The
briefcase had been borrowed from the apartment of a private
investigator employed by one Jaffe, an IRS agent, while the
banker and the investigator were at dinner. The district court
found that
the United States, acting through Jaffe, "knowingly and will-
fully participated in the unlawful seizure of Michael Wolsten-
croft's briefcase. . . ." According to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth
Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully
conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individ-
ual in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... ,97
Faced with conclusive evidence that the United States gov-
ernment consciously used the standing rules developed by the
Supreme Court as a way to commit flagrant constitutional viola-
tions without sanction of any sort, the Court unanimously
declined to reconsider, or even to question, its holding that
fourth amendment rights may be asserted only by those whose
legitimate expectations of privacy have been violated. The only
real issue in the case was whether the supervisory powers of the
federal courts could be used as a device for denying admission of
the evidence obtained through a violation of a third person's
constitutional rights. By a vote of six to three, the Court
answered in the negative. Although three justices thought that a
nonconstitutional remedy should be provided to deter such
grossly illegal bad-faith searches and seizures, it is worth repeat-
ing that none of the justices questioned the basic notion that
suppression of evidence may be had, on constitutional grounds,
only by the victims of constitutional violations. At this point, no
justice of the United States Supreme Court has expressly either
acknowledged or refuted the basic logic of the California posi-
tion: that effective deterrence of constitutional violations
requires that illegally obtained evidence be excluded at the
instance of any person against whom it is offered.
Another consideration, entirely unspoken but perhaps more
persuasive than the idea that deterrence may be had despite the
existence of loopholes the size of quarries, is the idea that
unrestricted use of the exclusionary rule actually inhibits its
97. Id. at 730.
[Vol. 6:1
Standing and Section 7
deterrent function. Under this theory, it is recognized that the
exclusionary rule gives ample incentive to criminal defendants to
raise every conceivable search and seizure claim. The resultant
case-by-case determination of the meaning of such terms as
"unreasonable searches and seizures" and "probable cause" has
given the fourth amendment a bewildering complexity, far
beyond the ability of even increasingly sophisticated law
enforcement officers to cope with. By making compliance with
fourth amendment guarantees impossible even for the usual
officer who acts in good faith, the exclusionary rule is actually
counterproductive. The officers are tempted, understandably, to
throw up their hands at the legal complexities and plow ahead
with whatever techniques will incriminate the suspect, hoping
that the prosecutor will find a way to justify their actions in
court. Whatever the accuracy of this theory, the Supreme Court
is not likely to acknowledge it, bearing as it does ultimate
responsibility for the present state of constitutional law." Yet,
to engage further in a personal speculation, this unarticulated,
unacknowledged principle may in fact animate the Supreme
Court's present eagerness to restrict application of the exclu-
sionary rule.
On the other hand, the Court may simply have decided that
deterrence of fourth amendment violations is not worth the sub-
stantial social costs entailed by exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence. As the Court has stated: "Each time the exclusionary
rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindica-
tion of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evi-
dence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at
trial is deflected." 99 But that view would call for reexamination
of the entire exclusionary rule, a task which the Court is clearly
unwilling to undertake.100 Whatever the explanation, it is diffi-
cult to reconcile the Rakas/Salvucci doctrine with any serious
judicial commitment to the idea of deterring official misconduct.
The Supreme Court has, on occasion, identified a second
purpose of the exclusionary rule: to protect judicial integrity.'01
98. The Court has shown some tendency to opt for understandable rules at the
expense of theoretical consistency. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). But it
has not seen fit to blame the exclusionary rule for the complexities of substantive fourth
amendment law.
99. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
100. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
101. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 n.8 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428
1982]
22 University of Puget Sound Law Review
The courts, it is reasoned, become parties to official misconduct
when they allow the use of evidence obtained through such mis-
conduct.10 2 This idea is both appealing and high-minded. Fulfill-
ment of this noble purpose would, of course, dictate that any
sort of standing requirement be abandoned. Judicial integrity,
after all, is sullied by the admission of any illegally obtained evi-
dence, no matter who was victimized by the illegality. Any
standing rule would undermine this splendid purpose.
But "judicial integrity," where mentioned at all, is always
listed as a secondary rationale of the exclusionary rule.' No
case suggests that it is by itself sufficient to justify operation of
the rule.More to the point, the protection of judicial integrity can
hardly be taken seriously as a basis for the exclusionary rule. No
discernible principle would justify the protection of judicial
integrity only within the perimeters in which the exclusionary
rule has operated or, in the judgment of its most vocal propo
nents, ought to operate. "Judicial integrity" would logically
require exclusion of all evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment, including exculpatory evidence illegally
obtained by the government and turned over to the defense by
the prosecution. It would encompass evidence obtained in viola-
tion of any constitutional provision. And it would require the
exclusion of any evidence, in any kind of case, tainted by any
sort of illegality. Moreover, "judicial integrity" could scarcely
rely on the adversary system to ferret out illegality in the
obtaining of evidence. The court itself would be obliged to
examine closely any evidence offered in order to ensure the
cleanness of its hands. In short, "judicial integrity" is an
unworkable exclusionary rule rationale, which must sadly be
disregarded.
B. Simpson and the Purposes of the Exclusionary Rule
It is inescapable that the Washington Supreme Court is
more faithful than the United States Supreme Court to the
stated purposes of the exclusionary rule. Both deterrence of offi-
cial misconduct and protection of judicial integrity are served by
maximizing the number of persons allowed to complain of
U.S. 465, 485 (1976).
102. See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (1955).
103. See cases cited supra note 101.
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unlawful searches or seizures. And by retaining the automatic
standing rule, the Washington court clearly expands the class of
complainants.
Nor does the automatic standing rule foster deterrence
merely by maximizing the number of instances in which official
misconduct will be punished. It operates to deter certain kinds
of police behavior. Since the rule gives standing to complain of a
seizure to anyone charged with possession of a seized item at the
time of the seizure, 10 4 a police officer contemplating seizure of
contraband, stolen property, or anything else likely to be the
subject of a possessory offense, can assume that the prosecution
of at least one possessor would be jeopardized by the seizure's
illegality. Under Rakas/Salvucci, by contrast, a police officer
may be aware that an unlawful search or seizure might not vio-
late the legitimate expectation of privacy of any potential
defendant.105
The idea of deterrence was one of the express rationales
behind the Simpson opinion.'" It is the strongest of those
rationales. The argument that automatic standing must be
retained to prevent the prosecution from using defendant's
statement, made to establish "standing," from being used to
impeach him,107 is met by the availability of a more surgically
precise remedy-interpreting the Washington Constitution to
prohibitsuch use. The court's opting to retain automatic stand-
ing springs from sounder principles, including deterrence. Simp-
son's deterrence rationale can be seen as lacking in theoretical
purity in that the decision's advancement of the deterrent func-
tion is limited. Nothing short of the California "vicarious exclu-
sionary rule" would provide the maximum deterrent effect nec-
essary to prevent atrocities such as that described in Payner.1"1
But to say that is not to criticize the Simpson opinion. For that
104. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 87 n.3 (1980); Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973).
105. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), in which Rawlings, by
dumping his "stash" of controlled substances into the purse of a female companion, for-
feited his legitimate expectation of privacy in the purse, and thus his right to complain
of the search of it. His admission of possession, however, was enough to sustain his con-
viction. In Salvucci itself, the search of which defendants complained took place in an
apartment rented by the wife of one of them. In each case, if the police could have
ascertained in advance, or gambled, that the person whose rights they planned to violate
was not a likely defendant, the exclusionary rule would not have prevented the violation.
106. State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 180, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206 (1980).
107. Id.
107.1 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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decision is based in part on what has become a rather quaint,
though not altogether obsolete, principle-stare decisis. Auto-
matic standing had been part of Washington law since 1962,08
and although it was originally adopted under the compulsion of
a federal rule that disappeared with Salvucci, the Simpson plu-
rality was surely entitled to conclude, as it did, that the rule had
"served our state well for 17 [sic] years" 109 and need not be
abandoned absent better reasons than Rakas/Salvucci's idee
fixe that all search and seizure questions boil down to whether a
defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy has been violated.
Preservation of the status quo from the radical change of United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence is hardly an illegitimate
state court function.
All that aside, however, the Washington Supreme Court
ought to give due and reasoned consideration to the inherent
tension between any sort of "standing" requirement in search
and seizure cases and the declared exclusionary rule purposes of
deterring official misconduct and promoting judicial integrity. As
long as it proclaims those purposes, it ought to resort to them
unequivocally in justifying any adjective rules it adopts for the
resolution of search and seizure issues.
C. Washington- Cradle of a New Search and Seizure
Theory?
Simpson represents a not-too-gingerly step by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court into what has been called the "new federal-
ism"-the interpretation of state constitutional provisions,
where permissible, differently from their federal constitutional
analogs. 10 In the process of such interpretation, state courts
enjoy an exhilarating, even intoxicating freedom. This freedom
is restricted on the one side by the demands of the judicial pro-
cess for rational decision making, and on the other-especially
in Washington, a state with an elected judiciary and initiative
constitutional amendments-by democratic realities. Any effec-
tive decision must be persuasive to the legal community and
palatable to the concerned lay citizen.
The Simpson dissenters' criticism of the majority opinion as
108. State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962).
109. 95 Wash. 2d at 181, 622 P.2d at 1206.
110. See supra note 82 and Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:
State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
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insufficiently guided by "principle" in its interpretation of arti-
cle I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution' is somewhat
wide of the mark. If "principle" means "fully developed juris-
prudence," there is some validity to the charge. But Anglo-
American jurisprudence tends to develop in the wake of cases
decided on ad hoc bases. " 2 "Principle" to the dissenters equates
with a justification for refusal to follow the lead of the United
States Supreme Court. The dissenters would accord decisions of
that body a presumption of correctness and place a heavy bur-
den of rebuttal on those who would have the temerity to suggest
a different approach." s This view, it is submitted, is admirable
in the abstract, but untenable when applied to the concrete situ-
ation of the exclusionary rule.
This article has already demonstrated the unwillingness of
the United State Supreme Court to apply the exclusionary rule
in accordance with its declared purposes. It is difficult to give
any weight to a line of cases supported by no principle other
than ipse dixit, even if handed down by the final arbiter of the
federal constitution. Subject to the constraints mentioned above,
a state court should feel entirely free, if it has the requisite crea-
tive energy, to develop its own theories of reasoned interpreta-
tion of its own constitutional provisions-regardless of their lin-
guistic resemblance, or lack thereof, to federal cognates-giving
United States Supreme Court decisions such weight, if any, as
their persuasive effect dictates." 4 To the extent that the Wash-
ington Supreme Court undertakes such development it will be
free from the charge of result-oriented reaction to federal
decisions." 5
There are several different possible approaches to applying
article I, section 7. One is to write off the exclusionary rule alto-
gether, as a costly, noble experiment that failed to produce its
promised pragmatic results."' But the Washington courts have
111. See Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the
State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 97 (1977).
112. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes' celebrated cliche: "The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1880).
113. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 199-202, 622 P.2d 1199, 1216-18 (1980).
114. See Falk, The Supreme Court of California 1971-72, Foreword: The State
Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALiF. L. Rav. 273
(1973).
115. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d at 199, 622 P.2d at 1216.
116. Cf. the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 412-24 (1971).
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shown no disposition to take this course, and there is little point
in exploring it further. Another is to recognize deterrence as the
purpose of the rule and build a jurisprudence by constant recur-
rence to that purpose. This approach would be reasonable if
based on significant evidence that the exclusionary rule really
does deter official misconduct. However difficult it may be to
find hard evidence of such deterrent effect, Payner stands as a
reminder of the consequences of relaxing the rule.
But there is another approach, one toward which the Wash-
ington Supreme Court appears to be moving. Quite simply, this
approach would recognize the exclusionary rule as a moral
imperative, not dependent upon any pragmatic justification. The
court's movement toward this view is manifested in a recent
Washington case, State v. White, 1 7 which, superficially, has
nothing to do with standing. In that case, police made an arrest
pursuant to a statute which the Washington Supreme Court
held unconstitutionally vague. Since that holding rendered the
arrest invalid, the issue was whether the fruit of the invalid
arrest-in this case, a confession and certain seized
goods-should be suppressed. The court held that it should be.
But in reaching that conclusion, the court had to deal with the
case of Michigan v. DeFiflippo.18
On similar facts, the United States Supreme Court in
DeFillippo refused to suppress the fruit of an unlawful arrest. It
reasoned that, since the statute had never before been invali-
dated, it was presumptively valid. Police officers could not be
expected, and should not be encouraged, to make their own
determinations of the validity of duly-enacted statutes. Since
police could not be deterred from making arrests under pre-
sumptively valid statutes, the deterrent purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule would not be served by suppression. The Washing-
ton Supreme Court rejected this reasoning on three grounds: (1)
The Washington statute was "flagrantly unconstitutional," and
thus came within language in DeFillippo suggesting that sup-
pression would be proper where a reasonable police officer
should appreciate the statute's invalidity;" 9 (2) even though
police might not be deterred from arresting in like circum-
stances, legislatures could and should be deterred from enacting
117. 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
118. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
119. 97 Wash. 2d at 102-04, 640 P.2d at 1067-68.
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such statutes;12 and (3) pursuant to the mandate of the Wash-
ington Constitution. In the court's own words:
The result reached by the United States Supreme Court in
DeFillippo is justifiable only if one accepts the basic premise
that the exclusionary rule is merely a remedial measure for
Fourth Amendment violations. As a remedial measure, evi-
dence is excluded only when the purposes of the exclusionary
rule can be served. This approach permits the exclusionary
remedy to be completely severed from the right to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusions. Const. art. 1, § 7 differs
from this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in that it
clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy with no
express limitations.2 '
From these observations it is but a short step toward a reex-
amination of the entire utilitarian jurisprudence on which the
United States Supreme Court has based its development of the
exclusionary rule. The Court has approached the enforcement of
the fourth amendment in the same spirit as contemporary-and
often ancient-lawyers approach the enforcement of the crimi-
nal law: as an effort to control human conduct through the
threatened or actual imposition of sanctions.122 These sanctions
(punishment of a criminal, or exclusion of probative evidence
offered in a criminal trial) being costly, they are to be imposed
only when their social benefits clearly outweigh their costs. 23
The pragmatic effort to control conduct utterly supplants con-
cern with the moral principles underlying, respectively, the
criminal law and the fourth amendment. The idea of punishing
violators of these principles simply because they are violators is
thought pointless at best and barbaric at worst, since it would
involve the imposition of social costs without corresponding ben-
efits. Under such utilitarian jurisprudence, morality becomes
irrelevant and the enforcement of law becomes divorced from
the idea of justice.12 4
120. Id. at 105-08, 640 P.2d at 1068-70.
121. Id. at 109-10, 640 P.2d at 1070-71 (footnotes omitted).
122. See Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285 (Ct. of Oyer and Terminer,
Philadelphia, 1930) (quoting Plato, Seneca, Beccaria, and Hobbes in support of the pro-
position that punishment is justified only to serve some pragmatic goal). The criminal
law, of course, seeks to control conduct not only through the threat of punishment, but
also by using punishment for the reform or incapacitation of the offender.
123. See id.; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 n.3 (1978), and cases cited therein.
124. The three modern justifications for criminal punishment are deterrence,
restraint, and rehabilitation. Yet deterrence does not require the punishment of the
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The efficacy of deterrence in the criminal law, as noted ear-
lier,12 is suspect and speculative at best. The efficacy of the
exclusionary rule in the deterrence of police misconduct is in
grave doubt.12 The idea of deterrence as justifying the exclu-
sionary rule is stretched to the breaking point in most warrant
cases, where the person to be deterred turns out to be the magis-
trate, whose judgment on probable cause does not accord with
that of an appellate court. Furthermore, the use of deterrence as
a justification for any kind of punishment trivializes and under-
mines the moral principle which is purportedly being enforced,
as those engaged in enforcement speculate on how selective that
enforcement may become without sacrificing deterrent efficacy.
It is, in other words, time to acknowledge the severe limitations
of the deterrent rationale that has long been used to sell the
exclusionary rule to a skeptical bar and public.
If the Washington Supreme Court continues its march
toward use of the exclusionary rule as a necessary remedy for
every unlawful privacy violation that produces evidence offered
in Washington courts, it can jettison the increasingly disturbing
pretense of deterrence. It can state, with untroubled conscience,
that it excludes evidence obtained through privacy violations
simply because exclusion is morally right and legally necessary
to uphold and vindicate the underlying privacy guarantee. It
would have no answer to the pragmatist who would complain of
the exclusion of relevant, probative evidence without announced
compensating utilitarian justification. It would meet the argu-
ment of the angry prosecutor, livid at the freeing of the guilty,
only by invoking the principle that privacy is as important as
condign punishment (and by pointing out that, had the Consti-
tution been observed, the prosecutor would not have had the
evidence in the first place). It may, however, find a surprisingly
receptive audience in the lay public, beset by crime and cynical
about the exclusion of evidence in the holy name of deter-
rence-but perhaps able to grasp the simple morality of exclud-
ing evidence merely because it is right to redress the violation of
guilty, but only of someone who can be made to appear guilty. Restraint and rehabilita-
tion require only the identification of someone who needs treatment, not someone who is
guilty of a crime. See C. S. LEwis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in GoD IN
Tm DOCK 287 (1970).
125. See supra text accompanying note 95.
126. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI.
L. Ra. 665, 667 (1970).
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a constitutional guarantee.
Such a rule would doubtless continue to have some signifi-
cant deterrent effect. It would offer judicial integrity some com-
fortable protection. It would enhance the role of government as
moral teacher, so eloquently proclaimed by Mr. Justice Bran-
deis.127 But these things would no longer be the aim of the exclu-
sionary rule, nor the purposes guiding its interpretation.
Recognition of the exclusionary rule as a moral imperative
would provide the basis for interpretation of the rule in such
areas as availability of the exclusionary rule on collateral
attack128 and attenuation of "fruit of the poisoned tree. 12 In
such cases, it may well result in exclusion of evidence now
admitted or granting of remedies now withheld, where the moral
principle of the privacy guarantee is deemed sufficiently present.
But what of "standing?" Ironically, rejection of the United
States Supreme Court's deterrence rationale and substitution of
the principle of the exclusionary rule as a moral imperative
would result in giving Washington the very "standing" doctrine
expressed in Rakas/Salvucci. It is obvious that, with deterrence
cast aside as a failed and nonmoral rationale, and "judicial
integrity" regrettably abandoned as illusory, the only relevant
inquiry becomes one of whether a party's privacy rights were
violated. It would truly be immoral, as well as purposeless, to
allow a party to receive the windfall benefit of a violation of
someone else's rights. Only one who was disturbed in his own
private affairs, or whose home has been invaded without author-
ity of law, can properly demand exclusion under article I, section
7 on any but a deterence rationale. Indeed, the point seems to
have been implicitly acknowledged in the following language
from White (which also suggests unarticulated acceptance of the
"moral imperative" exclusionary principle):
We specifically note that this application of the exclusionary
rule under Const. art. 1, § 7 will have no effect on our previous
cases regarding "standing". [Sic.] Before a defendant has
standing to challenge a search or seizure, he must adequately
demonstrate that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy
which society is prepared to recognize as legitimate. This
127. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
128. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
129. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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establishes the "right to privacy" which may or may not give
rise to the exclusionary remedy, depending on the
circumstances.1 0
Despite the court's first sentence, it is clear that its emerging
jurisprudence has profound implications for "standing." It has
undermined the Simpson plurality's rationale for retaining the
automatic standing rule and set the stage for a new and exclu-
sive focus on violation of a particular defendant's legitimate
expectation of privacy.
CONCLUSION
It is the proper function of commentators to exhort the
judiciary to principled decision making. And it is the task of the
courts to decide real cases under real pressures. We have begun
with the Washington Supreme Court's rejection of an analyti-
cally unsupported, and therefore unpersuasive, opinion of the
United States Supreme Court. And we urge the court to under-
take development of a thoroughly principled alternative juris-
prudence. There are two such alternatives. One proclaims deter-
rence as the proper purpose of the exclusionary rule, and shapes
substantive and adjective search and seizure rules in order to
fulfill that purpose. The other regards the exclusionary rule as a
moral imperative for the vindication of the underlying constitu-
tional privacy guarantee, requiring no further justification.
The Washington Supreme Court has tried first one, then
the other, repudiating neither. At this point it is, in the meta-
phor of Mr. Justice Harlan, attempting to ride two rather unruly
horses at once. 181 This article has indicated a familiarity with
both of these fine steeds and a preference for one. The time has
arrived for the Washington Supreme Court to place itself firmly
astride one of these horses and train it as a worthy, useful, and
gentle mount.
130. 97 Wash. 2d at 110-11 n.9, 640 P.2d at 1071 n.9.
131. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 501 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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